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BOSINA On the
historical border
By
HE Mr Alija
Izetbegovic
Former President of Bosnia Herzegovina
EXCELLENCIES,
Ladies
and Gentlemen, dear friends: I was very honoured when I was invited
by Dr Nizami to speak at the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies. I
was glad that this was to take place at such an important cultural
centre as Oxford, and at such an important time as the beginning of
the new millennium.
Today
I visited the Centre for Islamic Studies. Although I have known a
great deal about its activities, I was impressed to hear from Dr
Nizami about some future projects. This Centre is for the benefit of
the Muslims in Europe and the world, and indeed for the benefit of
all others. I want to extend my full support and ask all those who
can to do so.
Ihave
decided to speak about my country, Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a
challenging topic, for to speak about Bosnia and Herzegovina means
to speak about two
worlds—East and West—and about their encounters, which have been
both fruitful and destructive. The line that separates (or joins, if
you will) those
two
worlds
has run during many centuries, at times eastwards, at times
westwards, through Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Bosnia, great powers
and great religions in the history of Europe—the Roman Empire,
Charlemagne's empire, the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian empires,
and the religions of Western and Eastern Christianity, Judaism, and
Islam—have overlapped and merged. The product of these clashes and
influences is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multicultural
Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country that in this respect is a rarity
in the world.
Bosnia
and Herzegovina, a small country of 51,000 square kilometres, is
situated in the western part of the Balkan peninsula roughly between
the latitudes of 420 and 450N and the longitudes of 15~ and 1 90E.
It marches to the north and west with the Republic of Croatia, and
to the east and south with Serbia and Montenegro. According to the
1991 census, Bosnia had a population of some 4,377,000, of which 44
per cent were Bosniacs (predominantly Muslim), 17.4 per cent Croats
(predominantly Catholic), 31.2 per cent Serbs (predominantly
Orthodox Christian), and
7.7
per
cent others (mainly of mixed religious background).
The
present-day political borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina were
established during the eighteenth and nineteenth century by a series
of peace accords and conventions but, as a geopolitical entity,
Bosnia has an almost unbroken history from the mid- medieval period
to the present. From 1180 to 1463 Bosnia was an independent kingdom;
from 1580 to 1878
it
was an
ayalet (a term designating the largest territorial unit in
the Turkish empire); from 1878 to 1918
it
was a
‘crown land’ within the AustroHungarian Empire; and from 1945 to
1992 it
was
one of the federal republics of Yugoslavia. Since 1992 Bosnia and
Herzegovina has been an independent state and a member of the United
Nations.
The
history of Bosnia is a history of struggle for its own identity and
independent position on the dividing line between
two
worlds. In the Middle Ages that desire to belong neither to East nor
West, or to belong to both, is well illustrated by the phenomenon
known as Bogumilism or the ‘Bosnian Church’. The specific Bosnian
Church or Bosnian heresy was an expression of the resistance of
Bosnia and the ‘Good Bosnians’ to the rulers of the Christian
Church, both the Byzantine, in Constantinople, and the Roman as
well.
The
heretical movement that was to find a firm foothold in Bosnia arose
in the East, and reached Macedonia via the Bosphorus in the
mid-tenth century. Its founder, the priest Bogumil, taught that
there were two
divinities, two principles—the principle of good and the principle
of evil—God and Satan. The Bogumils rejected the sacraments,
liturgy, the church, the cross, statues, and icons.
Hostility between the Christian East and West reached a peak when
the Crusaders seized Constantinople in 1204 and founded their Latin
empire. After six wars of the Crusades, of which five were failures,
discontent began to foment among the common people. Instead of the
rapid victory over the so-called ‘unbelievers’ that the Pope had
promised them, there had been defeat after defeat. Instead of
concord between people in the Christian world, there was discord and
dissension; instead of rich plunder, there were casualties and
misery.
Bosnia, which was one of the heartlands of the heresy, lay on the
borders between the Eastern and the Western Churches. Successive
Popes sought to reinforce their positions on that dividing line.
Along with this ecclesiastical confrontation, the interests of
various secular powers intersected in Bosnia, in particular those of
Hungary and Byzantium. The Bosnian heresy was the expression of both
aspects of resistance, the spiritual and the political. This united
popes and kings against Bosnia. In 1200, Pope Innocent III invited
the Hungarian King Emerik to launch a war against the Bosnian Ban
Kuhn, and sent his own chaplain, Ivan Kasamarin, to persuade the
most prominent Bogumil leaders to renounce their teachings and
recognize the supreme authority of the Roman Church. They did so in
Bihino Polje in 1203, but
it
seems
that their repentance was not sincere, since the following two
hundred years witnessed a series of crusading wars against Bosnia,
most of them unsuccessful. The first was launched by Pope Gregory IX
in 1234, followed by the Hungarian King Ludovig in 1363, and then by
King Zigmund in 1408. The Bosnian Church was not extinguished;
it
remained an important factor in the defence of the country against
external attack. It was only when the Bosnian King Toma~ (1443—6 1)
was
faced
with the Turkish threat that he began to show sympathies with the
Vatican. When Bosnia came under Turkish rule, in 1463, the Bogumil
heresy disappeared, and most of the Bosnian Church’s followers
adopted Islam.
Bosnia
remained under Turkish rule for more than four hundred years. The
Islamization of the greater part of the population, which was a
gradual process, is the most marked and most important
characteristic of the New Age history of Bosnia.
It
was
when
Turkish rule began that Orthodox priests and congregations began to
be mentioned for the first time,
and
certain Orthodox monasteries were referred to as early as the
sixteenth century (in Tavna, Lomnica, Papra~a, and Ozren). The
Franciscans began to be active in Bosnia from the mid-fourteenth
century, and in 1463, in Fojnica,
Sultan
Mehmed the Conqueror signed the famous Ahd-nama or Letter of
Covenant, which guaranteed freedom of action to the Franciscans in
Bosnia.
In the
mid-sixteenth century, with the approval of the Turkish authorities,
a large number of Jews came to Bosnia after their expulsion from
Spain, along with the Muslims, following the fall of Granada in
1492. The Albanian priest Peter Masarechi states, in his account
dating from 1624, that there were 150,000 Catholics, 75,000
Orthodox, and 450,000 Muslims living in Bosnia at that time. There
is reliable evidence of the existence of a large Jewish community as
well, although Masarechi does not give the number of Jews. Bosnia
thus became one of the few countries in which the adherents of four
religions live intermingled, a true Abraham’s Ecumena.
Throughout the eighteenth century, the Bosnian Muslims defended
Bosnia against Austria, but also against Ottomans, because at the
same time there arose a separatist tendency among the Bosnian
Muslims in regard to Istanbul. They demanded autonomy for Bosnia,
and strongly opposed the reforms of Selim III (1789—1809). This
resistance was to cease only with the victory of Sultan Mahmud over
Husein-beg Grada~éevié, in 1832.
In
1737, the Bosnian army defeated the AustroHungarian army in a battle
near Banja Luka, after which there were no attacks by foreign armies
on Bosnia for
fifty
years;
but in 1788 another war broke out between Turkey on the one hand and
Austria and Russia on the other. The Austrian Emperor Joseph II and
the Russian Empress Catherine the Great came to an agreement to
seize the Balkans from the Turks and divide the region between their
two empires. The division of geopolitical interests in the Balkans
was to lead, ultimately, to the Austrian occupation of Bosnia in
1878. Thus began the western domination of Bosnia that lasts to this
day. First was Austria, which formally annexed Bosnia in 1908. After
the First World War, Bosnia became part of the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes, later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which until
1943 was a monarchy under Serb domination. For the following almost
fifty
years,
Bosnia was a republic under Communist rule.
‘When
all this came to an end, and Bosnia proclaimed its independence in
1992, all the veils fell, and the country was seen in its bare
relief: three nations, or perhaps more accurately three
religions—Islam, Catholicism, and Serbian Orthodoxy. There was
almost no one left of the fourth, the Jews: they had been
exterminated by people who came from the heart of Europe, in the war
years of 1941 and 1942. There remained only a small community of a
few thousand, regarded with welt-merited respect.
The
major upheavals resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the Eastern Bloc shook Yugoslavia, which itself straddled the Great
Divide. Yugoslavia disintegrated into its basic components of which
it
was
composed. The key country, linking all these different components in
one, was the multinational and multicultural Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The forces that destroyed Yugoslavia from within attempted to do the
same to Bosnia. The country
was
attacked by aggressor forces from the east (in 1992) and then from
the west (in 1993). Bosnia mounted a desperate defence, at the core
of which were the Bosnian Muslims. The role that was played in the
defence of medieval Bosnia by the ‘Bosnian Church’ was now played by
Islam, as the spiritual bulwark of the majority nation, albeit of
course in wholly different historical circumstances.
The
Serbian national plan, defined in the nineteenth century, envisaged
a Serbia extending as far as Karlobag in Croatia—that is, covering
the whole of Bosnia. The Croatian national plan saw ‘Croatia to the
Drina’, again covering the whole of Bosnia, but from the other
direction. Milo~evié and Tudman are merely the symbols of this new
confrontation in a different historical context. The decisive
resistance of Bosnia demonstrated that the country is rooted in
history and cannot be destroyed even by upheavals of major
intensity, but the human and material cost of the war was appalling:
230,000 people killed, two million forced out of their homes,
thousands of towns and villages razed to the ground. Multi-ethnic
Bosnia was seriously wounded, but she survived.
When
the war came to an end and the public began to forget what caused
it
and
how it
began,
doubts about the nature of the conflict were skilfully aroused: was
it
a case
of external aggression, or was
it
a
civil war between ‘three warring peoples’? The aggressors and their
local accomplices sought to prove that
it
was a
civil war, and proving
it
to be
a civil war also means proving that the idea of Bosnia is dead. The
question of the nature of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is of
major importance,
so
permit
me to cite some facts in extenso:
The UN
Security Council adopted Resolution 752 as early as 15 May 1992,
demanding ‘an immediate cessation of all external involvement in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, including units of the Yugoslav Army and of
the Croatian Army’ (operative paragraph 3 of the Resolution). Since
the Belgrade regime did not comply with the demands of Resolution
752, the Security Council repeated them in Resolution 757, of 30 May
1992, and imposed sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.
In
operative paragraph 5 of Resolution 787, of 16 December 1992, the UN
Security Council demanded that neighbour countries cease
infiltrating para-military groups into Bosnia and Herzegovina,
drawing attention this time to units from the army of neighbouring
Croatia.
Resolution 47/121 of 8 December 1992, titled ‘The Situation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina’, explicitly uses the word ‘aggression’.
Expressing its dismay that the Security Council sanctions had had no
effect, the UN General Assembly accused the Yugoslav Army of ‘direct
and indirect support for acts of aggression against Bosnia and
Herzegovina’, and in operative paragraph 2, the Resolution ‘strongly
condemns Serbia, Montenegro and Serbian forces in the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina for violations of the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and for conduct contrary to the Resolutions of the
Security Council, the UN General Assembly and the London Peace
Agreement of 25 August 1992’. In paragraph 3 the UN General Assembly
demands that ‘Serbia and Montenegro cease their acts of aggression
and hostility and that they comply wholly and unconditionally with
the relevant Resolutions of the Security Council’. In paragraph 7
the General Assembly calls on the Security Council to ‘use all
available means to preserve and establish the sovereignty,
territorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovinà’. This demand is repeated in UN Security Council
Resolutions 819, of 16 April 1993, and 838, of 10 June 1993, and in
the presidential statements of 24 April 1992 and 17 March 1993.
UN
General Assembly Resolution 48/88, of 20 December 1993, titled ‘The
Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, notes that the aggression
against Bosnia and Herzegovina is continuing and calls on the
Security Council to implement Resolution 838, of 10 June 1993,
without delay.
As a
result of the hesitation of the great powers, the United Nations
Resolutions were not implemented, and there was no military
intervention to prevent the genocide, but
it
was
repeatedly noted that this was a case of aggression against Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
Muslim
countries, without exception, supported the adoption of resolutions
condemning the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in
some cases initiated them. The statements made by representatives of
Western countries leave no doubt, either, of the nature of the
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. When Resolution 757, of 30 May
1992, was adopted, the statements such as the following were heard:
A
representative of the United States of America:
‘The
aggression of the Serbian regime and its military forces against
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a threat to international peace and
security, and a serious challenge to the values and principles on
which the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, and the Charter of
the United Nations are based.’
The
Russian Federation:
‘Belgrade has ignored good advice and warnings and has not brought
its conduct into conformity with the demands of the international
community. In this way
it
is
itself the cause of the United Nations sanctions. In voting for
sanctions, Russia is fulfilling its obligations as a permanent
member of the Security Council for the maintenance of international
law and order.’
France:
‘The
European Union and its member countries have already adopted a
series of measures against Yugoslavia, and called upon the Security
Council to take similar action.’
Great
Britain:
‘There
is in fact no doubt where the chief responsibility lies: with the
authorities, both civil and military, in Belgrade. This cannot be
covered up; they cannot prove that they have no connection with what
is happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Multi-barrelled rocket
launchers can’t be found in village barns. They come from the depots
of the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army.’ Et cetera, et cetera.
The
Hague Tribunal, passing sentence on indictments for war crimes, has
so far confirmed in three cases (the Tadié, Aleksovski, and Kordié)
that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was an international
conflict, and therefore a case of aggression.
It is
true that common living in Bosnia was characterized by ‘its terrible
ambivalence’, as Karl-Joseph Kuschel calls
it,
with
the theologian Hans Kung, currently the greatest exponent of
interrehigious dialogue in the world. This ‘ambivalence’ has always
raised once again the question whether Bosnia is possible. But did
not sceptics once raise the question of whether Europe was possible?
Immediately after the Second World War, when Denis de Rougemont
called upon Europe to unite, his appeal was met with derision. But
only forty years later, this unity is becoming a reality, and what
is being created before our very eyes is one of the most significant
events of the twentieth century.
My
good friend the Catholic theologian and writer Fra Petar Andelovié,
receiving the Human Rights Award (in Bonn on 9 June 1997), said,
‘The name Bosnia, and Bosnian-hood, is not a concept of national or
territorial order. It is primarily, and above all, the mark of a
civilization process that has been taking place through historical
changes and political events throughout an entire millennium. And to
the observation by a journalist that Bosnia is currently the scene
of conflicts between peoples, ideas, religions, and cultures, he
retorted almost angrily, ‘Bosnia has only been a place of conflict
for a few years, and those were externally devised conflicts. Bosnia
has otherwise always been a place of encounter of peoples, religions
and customs, and this makes her unusual, interesting and great, and
as such there can be no death for her, for if she dies,
it
will
be the death of an example of how people can live and overcome all
the threats of times to come.
The
prerequisite for Bosnia is not homogenization, some kind of new
melting pot in which a homogeneous Bosnian nation would be created
from today’s Serbs, Croats, Bosniacs, and others. America today is
an example of a relatively harmonious multi-ethnic community, but in
the recent census, 83 per cent of Americans declared themselves as
having some ethnic identification, and only 6 per cent declared
themselves as Americans and nothing else. America has remained a
pluralist state in the ethnic sense, but this has not prevented her
from also being a stable multi-ethnic community.
Both
Europe and America, however, have gone through long periods of their
own ambivalence. The two greatest horrors of the twentieth century
fascism and bolshevism—are European inventions. Throughout its
history, Europe has shown a great talent for dictatorships and
violence, while American Christianity was until recently infected
with racism: even by the mid-century, many churches still had the
inscription that only the whites were allowed to enter.
The
century that is just behind us has been called by many, with
justification, a century of violence:
two
great wars and numerous smaller ones, in which millions of lives
have been lost, and which have seen concentration camps,
anti-Semitism, and political show trials. It was only in mid-century
and in the second half of the century that signs of hope emerged:
the Charter of the United Nations, human rights conventions, the
abolition of race restrictions in America, the Helsinki Final Act
and its so-called Third Basket of human rights, and so on. The truth
is
that the dark shadow of events in the Balkans falls across these
hopes, but the positive processes are of global significance.
And
between the three great religions, changes are taking place. In
1965, Pope John Paul II visited Morocco and addressed more than
80,000 young Muslims on the subject of ‘our common God of Abraham’,
and the following year he visited the synagogue in Rome. It was the
first time in history that the leader of the Catholic Church has
crossed the threshold of a Jewish place of worship, an act which
meant extending a hand to the people that for twenty
centuries had been accused of the murder of Jesus Christ.
Many
people ask me whether I am optimistic about the future of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. I usually answer: Yes, I am. A long way has been
passed:
freedom of movement has been established in the whole country,
refugees are returning to their homes, multi-ethnic police and
multi-ethnic border services are being established, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina is gradually becoming integral part of Europe. These
processes are slow indeed, but the direction is right, and the whole
world supports them. Just as I was finishing this, the UN Security
Council, debating the current crisis in Bosnia, once again supported
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Bosnia, a country on the Great Divide, is continuing to develop as a
multinational and multicultural community in a world that is also a
patchwork of races, peoples, religions, and cultures.
Finally, I believe God Himself likes diversity. The dilemma—a
monochrome or a polychrome world— is resolved by the Holy Qur’an, in
sura al-Maida: ‘If God had willed, He would have made you one
nation.’
Obviously, He did not so will. Let us therefore be proud of what we
are and offer one another mutual respect.
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